Here is the thing. This colloquium I think was one of the most
interesting points in my life since moving up to New York. It taught me
two major things about my life. The first is that no matter how much
Philosophy I studied in College, it was simply a guide into much more
rocky and torrential terrain then I could ever have perceived. The
second is that I really enjoy that terrain.

I remember vaguely when during several classes when Professor’s made off
hand remarks about how “unimportant” and “technical” certain words could
be. For instance, Dr. Korcz opened the quagmire called identity and
left it open saying that, “identity theory can get really technical and
complex so lets not concern ourselves with it right now”. during my
metaphysics class. Now you might notice that “identity” comes into the
title of colloquium. It is important to understand that, because in the
end that was a key point to the whole discussion.

Now a second thing you must understand is that I will not be relaying
his whole speech here. I’m simply organizing my own thoughts about the
whole discussion. I did not understand a lot of the verbiage. The
discussion began with an introduction that listed his main concerns.

What does it mean to be a liberal?
– He quotes J.S.Mill in answering this. According to Mill the argument
is similar as to what follows.
P1 There was a point in the past in which I was wrong. (unequivocal
fact. No argument available)
P2 It could be the cast that I am currently wrong in any belief I hold.
C1 Therefore I should approach any contrary opinion with the notion that
they could be conceived correct at some point.

What is identity?
– Now in this example he quotes someone who I’m unfamiliar with (Aier
perhaps? his accent confused the name for me) to describe commitments
and how they are setup as defining identity. This is where it gets
vague and confusing. I.E. No clear cut premises-conclusion structure.
A person has commitments depending on the identity they choose to bind
themselves with. If you identify with the Muslim faith, then you follow
the Koran and other such tenements. He went on to say that you often
adhere to commitments in the present more strongly if in the future you
see your self losing those commitments. In other words, A Muslim sees
his culture dying out and therefore finds himself adhering to
commitments more fanatically then before. This is how a person’s moral
identity is supposed to be structured. This is also how it was given in
the lecture. ……. I feel like I’ve left a lot out.

Another portion of the lecture was spent discussing relations of
commitments. This was a big chunk of the discussion and also a major
point in his argument. His argument is that there seem to be relations
between ideas that are not simply mechanical. (exact terms vary I did
not take notes because I left my pencil at home……… sigh.)

Set one:
– To do philosophy
– To eat vitamins after every meal

Set two:
– To do philosophy
– To do all in one’s ability to please one’s father. (in this example to
do philosophy is not contrary nor counter to pleasing one’s father)

According to him, the second set has a relationship with each other that
cannot be explained mechanically. He argues that it is not the case
that to do one is to also do two, nor is it the case to do in
accomplishing one, two is fulfilled. They are separate ideas not
causally chained in any fashion. He goes on to point out that there
still seems to be a relationship between the two ideas. He steps back
and says that this simple example can be extrapolated to commitments
across the knowledge area and that these relationships make up the
identities of the individual involved.

His conclusion is that the liberalist argument fails when you take into
account the myth of Odysseus (may be incorrect with my knowledge of
Grecian myths, I want to say he called the guy Sisyphus but I know it
isn’t that myth). When Odysseus lashes himself to the mast and tells
his shipmates to not let him free no matter what he will say in the
future, there is an understanding that Odysseus future self will have
commitments that are different then what his commitments are now. Now
let us assume that in the future while lashed to the ship, another ship
appears and attempts to capture the ship. If Odysseus argues in the
future that they should unlash him to fight off the invading ship, then
he would be obeying by a commitment of his previous self and yet the
commitment would be evaluated using a new means of evaluation.

My overall understanding of this is seriously rocky, and I don’t think I
should post this. I am assuming that this contradiction between
previous selves and future selves makes the argument for liberalism
flawed and not as inductive as it should be. Hmm… let me think about
this some more. A major comment through the discourse is that Mill’s
setup is to create an argument that is deductive and all inclusive and
not reliant upon evaluative stances. In other words, his argument is as
base and core to understanding as all other arguments should be. This
is also the appeal. The contents within his argument cannot be disputed
as far as I can tell, it is just the conclusion that raises concern.